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In a first best setting, all information is publicly available and the government 
redistributes income at will. Efficiency can be achieved independently of equity 
concerns through lump sum transfers. In the absence of market failures, indirect 
taxation is superfluous and intermediary products should not be taxed. Externalities, if 
any, can be corrected through Pigovian taxes, and the Samuelson rule applies to the 
provision of public goods. In a second best environment, where some individual 
characteristics are privately known and not publicly observable, the associated 
incentive constraints restrict the scope of redistribution. The optimal rules of taxation 
then typically differ from the first best ones, and efficiency can no longer be 
disconnected from equity considerations. 
 
Still the public finance literature exhibits cases in which the optimal second best rules 
have a first best flavor. In all these cases the economy displays some form of 
separability, either in the individual preferences or in the production side, coupled 
with a specific information structure. The purpose of this note is to put forward their 
common underlying structure. It appears that one can isolate in the second best 
program a part which has the shape of the first best, in the sense that the incentive 
constraints drop out. Thus the properties of first best allocations apply to the variables 
that are determined in this piece of the program.  This observation allows both to 
simplify the arguments and to generalize the results. Abstract
In a second best environment, the optimal policy choice sometimes follows the
rst best rules. This note lays down the information structure and separability
assumptions under which this property holds in a variety of setups.
JEL classication numbers: H21, H11.
Keywords: separability, second best optimality, indirect taxes, Samuelson rule,
Pigovian taxation.1 Introduction
In a rst best setting, all information is publicly available and the government
redistributes income at will. Eciency can be achieved independently of equity
concerns through lump sum transfers. In the absence of market failures, indirect
taxation is super
uous and intermediary products should not be taxed. Exter-
nalities, if any, can be corrected through Pigovian taxes, and the Samuelson rule
applies to the provision of public goods. In a second best environment, where
some individual characteristics are privately known and not publicly observable,
the associated incentive constraints restrict the scope of redistribution. The opti-
mal rules of taxation then typically dier from the rst best ones, and eciency
can no longer be disconnected from equity considerations.
Still the public nance literature exhibits cases in which the optimal second
best rules have a rst best 
avor. The best known instance is the Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) theorem, according to which indirect taxation is useless though in-
dividual productivity is private information (see also Kaplow (2006) and Laroque
(2005)). In a dierent vein, Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) present a set of as-
sumptions under which education, as an intermediary input, should be tax-free.
In Cremer, Gahvari, and Ladoux (1998) Pigovian taxes are the appropriate way
to handle externalities, while a version of the Samuelson rule applies in Boadway
and Keen (1993), Guesnerie (1995), Nava, Schroyen, and Marchand (1996) and
Hellwig (2008b).
All these examples display some form of separability, either in the individ-
ual preferences or in the production side, coupled with a specic information
structure. The purpose of this note is to put forward their common underlying
structure. It appears that one can isolate in the second best program a part which
has the shape of the rst best, in the sense that the incentive constraints drop
out. Thus the properties of rst best allocations apply to the variables that are
determined in this piece of the program. This observation allows both to simplify
the arguments and to generalize the results.
The approach is simpler since it avoids solving for the second best allocation,
thus bypassing the diculties associated with rst order conditions and bunching.
The technique also allows to study unexplored setups. For instance, indirect
taxation appears to be super
uous in situations where agents dier along other
dimensions than in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). This is the case whenever this
additional heterogeneity is publicly observable. If the dierences are privately
known, the property holds when they do not aect the tastes for consumption
goods. Otherwise, indirect taxation typically is a useful instrument on top of
direct taxation.
This note is organized as follows. The next section presents a regularity
assumption that must be satised by the second best allocations under study.
Three dierent models are then examined, dealing with indirect taxation, the
nancing of education and the provision of public goods.
12 A non-satiation property
Consider an economy with consumers indexed by a possibly multidimensional
characteristic n whose cumulative distribution function in the population is F ().
Let the preferences of consumer n be represented by a utility function U(cn;g;n),
where cn is a nite vector of private goods and g is a public good. In this economy








The cost in private goods of producing g is 
(g), and the output yj belongs to
some production set Yj satisfying Arrow Debreu assumptions.
In a rst best setup, the government can impose the allocation it prefers on the
private sector. When goods are desirable, a benevolent government chooses an
allocation that exhausts resources, so that the feasibility constraints are strictly
binding. A (small) increase of resources in private goods then leads to a Pareto
improvement. We designate an allocation satisfying this property as a (locally)
non-satiated optimum.
In a second best situation, the government has more limited power, which
translates into additional constraints. We shall consider second best optima which
are locally non-satiated, in spite of these constraints. The production eciency
lemma of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) states conditions under which the non-
satiation property is satised in an economy with linear taxation. This property
is also valid with non-linear taxation in the Mirrlees (1971) setup, under the
single-crossing condition (Hellwig (2007)). It seems plausible that second best
optima are locally non-satiated in fairly general circumstances, for instance in
the absence of single-crossing under multidimensional heterogeneity.
3 Indirect taxes
3.1 Ability is private information
There are k consumption goods indexed by i (i = 1;:::;k) and labor. The goods
are produced from labor according to a linear technology such that one unit of
good i is obtained with pi units of eective labor. The typical agent has a before
tax income y = n`, the product of her productivity n by her labor supply `.
Her preferences are represented by a utility function U(V (c);`), where c is her
consumption vector. This function is separable between consumption goods on
the one hand, and labor supply on the other hand. The argument extends to
situations where preferences dier (see Section 3.2).
The government observes individual income y but not separately individual
productivity nor labor supply. It announces a non linear income tax schedule R()
2which relates before tax income y to after tax income R(y). It may also impose
linear taxes q   p on consumption goods, where q is the vector of consumer
prices. Given q and R(), an agent whose before tax income is y chooses a bundle
of consumption goods which maximizes V (c) subject to the budget constraint
qc = R(y). The solution to this problem is the conditional demand function
c(q;R(y)).
Lemma 1. Consider a non-satiated second best allocation in which agent n has
before tax income y
n and consumes c
n. Given (y
n), (c
n) is a rst best allocation
of the economy where all the agents have the same quasi-concave and increasing









Indirect taxation is therefore super
uous.
Proof. The government chooses a vector of consumer prices q, an income prole
(yn) and the corresponding after tax income prole R(yn), which maximize a
weighted sum of utilities subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
U(V (c(q;R(yn)));yn=n)  U(V (c(q;R(ym)));ym=n)









n))) be the second best optimum. Let V 
n be the sub-utility
derived from consumption at this optimum, i.e., V 
n = V (c(q;R(y
n)).
For a given couple (q;R()), let Wq;R(y) = V (c(q;R(y))), a denition that
implicitly uses the assumption that the function V () is identical across agents.
Then an income prole (yn) satises the incentive compatibility constraints if
U(Wq;R(yn);yn=n)  U(Wq;R(ym);ym=n):
Therefore, given the optimal distribution (y
n) of before tax income, any (q;(R(y
n)))
that leaves the utility prole (V 
n) unchanged is incentive compatible. Under the
second welfare theorem (Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Proposition
6.D.1), any rst best optimum of the economy where agents have preferences









can be decentralized as a quasi-equilibrium with an appropriate choice of (q;R()).
Note that a non linear income tax here is needed for the government to be able to
3select freely the after tax income distribution. Now, we proceed by contradiction
to prove Lemma 1. Suppose that (q;(R(y
n))) is such that the second best
allocation (c
n) is not a rst best optimum of the economy. Then one can achieve




satiation property gives the desired contradiction.
Remark 1. The property holds for an economy with a general production set
Y , where the input is the aggregate supply of labor, measured in eciency units.




The production set Y can be derived from a more detailed structure, involving
intermediary inputs that are produced and used in the production process. Then
Lemma 1 implies no price distortions in the allocation of these inputs.
Remark 2. The previous argument extends to any situation where labor supply
is a function of the observable y and productivity n. However with a general
production set, as in the previous remark, it is natural to have wage, or labor
productivity, function of aggregate variables, e.g., aggregate capital or production.
As discussed in Stiglitz (1985), Lemma 1 then does not carry through. For
instance, if earnings depend on aggregate consumption, consumption enters the
incentive compatibility constraints outside the sub-utility V () once income is
substituted for labor supply, and separability fails.
3.2 More general heterogeneity
This section studies whether and how additional heterogeneity may aect the
result. The answer depends on whether this heterogeneity is observable.
Assume rst that, on top of ability n, the agents dier along other charac-
teristics z, such as family size, that are both non-observable and exogenous. On
the one hand, if the utility functions are of the form U(V (c);`;z), the argument
trivially extends and Lemma 1 applies. On the other hand, if the tastes for
consumption goods vary with the size of the family, i.e., z is an argument of
the function V , the utility derived from consumption goods when agent (n;z)
imitates agent (n0;z0) depends on his type z and Lemma 1 in general no longer
holds.
When z is non-observable but chosen endogenously, the situation depends
on how the choice of z varies with the agent's type n, given the government
instruments. If z is not an argument of V , the Lemma holds provided that z only
depends on variables not in V . Otherwise separability breaks down.
4Lemma 1 remains valid when the exogenous characteristics z are observable.
Then an agent can only imitate someone with the same z. If the utility functions
are of the form U(V (c;z);`;z), the allocation of consumption goods is rst best
for the economy where agents have utility functions (V (c;z)).
Consider nally the case where the observable z are endogenously chosen by
the agents. Everyone has a common utility function U(V (c;z);`;z) and picks a
z from a common set Z, again think of family size. The policy instruments are
the vector of consumer prices q, and the after tax income R(yn;zn) associated
with the prole (yn;zn). Then indirect taxation still is super
uous. A sketch of
the proof is as follows. Let Wq;R(y;z) = V (c(q;R(y;z));z). The prole (yn;zn)
satises the incentive compatibility constraints if
U(Wq;R(yn;zn);yn=n;zn)  U(Wq;R(ym;zm);ym=n;zm):
Let V 
n = V (c(q;R(y
n;z
n));z
n) be the sub-utility obtained by agent n at the




n))) that leaves (V 
n) un-
changed is incentive compatible.1
To summarize, indirect taxation is super
uous in situations where there is
more heterogeneity than in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). If this heterogeneity
is privately known, the result obtains when the tastes for consumption goods
are independent of this extra heterogeneity, something that is not required when
the relevant information is observed by the government. However, when hidden
private heterogeneity enters the sub-utility V , Lemma 1 fails.
4 Individual production sets
There is a single physical good, which is consumed or serves as an input in the
production process. All agents have identical utility functions U(c;`), with c nal
consumption. Net production of agent n is
y = (e;`;n)   e;
where e represents an individual investment in education. The government is as-
sumed to observe (c;e;y), but neither n nor `. It announces a schedule ((cn;en;yn))
among which agents make their choice. If agent n chooses (cn;en;yn), she must
accordingly supply a quantity of labor `n such that yn = (en;`n;n)   en. Fol-
lowing Bovenberg and Jacobs (2008), we assume the following property of the
production function
(e;`;n) = [ (n;`);e];
1The same argument formally applies when the sub-utilities depend on the variable y that
is observed by the government, as pointed out by Hellwig (2008a).
5with  monotone in its rst argument. This implies that there is a function A
such that the individual net production y = [ (n;`);e]   e can be rewritten as
A(y;e) =  (`;n):
In economic terms, this formulation seems demanding. The unknown labor supply
and characteristics of the typical agent are combined into an ability adjusted labor
supply  (`;n) of the kind discussed in Remark 2. Since the individual production
is a known function of this quantity and of other observables, and since this
function is identical across agents, the ability adjusted labor supply can actually
be inferred by the government from its observations.








n), at the second best the in-
dividual investment levels e
n and productions y
n are rst best ecient. They
maximize y = (A
n;e)   e.
Given the level of ability adjusted labor supply, investment is not distorted at
a non-satiated second best allocation.
Proof. The second best program maximizes a weighted sum of utilities subject
to the feasibility constraints
Z
n
(yn   cn)dF(n)  0, yn = [ (`n;n);en]   en
for every n, and subject to the incentive compatibility constraints
U(cn;`n)  U(cm;`nm);
for every (m;n) such that there is a `nm verifying ym = [ (`nm;n);em]   em, or
equivalently  (`nm;n) = A(ym;em)  Am. From the point of view of incentive
compatibility, announcing a schedule ((cn;en;yn)) is equivalent to announcing
a schedule (cn;An). Let ((c
n;e
n;y




n) the ability adjusted labor supply of agent n at this optimum. Given
(c
n), any ((yn;en)) which leaves (A
n) unchanged, i.e., such that A(yn;en) = A
n
for each n, satises the incentive compatibility constraints. One can now prove
Lemma 2 by contradiction. If (e
n) is not rst best ecient, there are resources





n =  (`
n;n). Under the non-satiation
hypothesis, this is a contradiction.
5 Public good provision
There is a single good which can be used for private or public consumption g and
labor. Labor can be transformed into goods at constant returns to scale, one unit
6of labor giving one unit of good. Everyone in the economy has the same utility
function U(V (c;g);`), but productivities n dier. As in Section 3, agent n must
work ` = y=n hours to get before tax income y.
The government observes individual incomes y, but neither individual pro-
ductivity n nor labor ` separately. It chooses a quantity of public good g and a
tax schedule which associates with any before tax income y an after tax income
R(y).
Given g, person n chooses the income y maximizing U(V (R(y);g);y=n).





n);g) is a rst best allocation of the economy with utility func-
tions V (cn;g) and production set
Z
n












The sum of the willingness to pay for public good of all consumers is equal to the
marginal cost of production.
Proof. It is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. Let V 
n = V (R(y
n);g) be the
sub-utility prole associated with the second best allocation. Given ((y
n)), any
consumption schedule ((cn);g) which keeps ((V 
n)) unchanged satises the in-
centive compatibility constraints. It is therefore attainable by the second best
government provided it satises the feasibility constraint
Z
n






This implies that the allocation (c
n;g) is rst best for the economy with utility
function V and aggregate resources
R
n y
ndF(n). Otherwise, the same utility pro-
le could be achieved with extra resources, a contradiction with the non-satiated
hypothesis.
Remark 3. It is possible to have more heterogeneity in tastes for public good, as
in Hellwig (2008b). Indeed, when preferences take the form u((c);`) +  (g;),
the incentive constraints are independent of the heterogeneity . The problem
separates into pieces: given the income tax schedule, one can look for the op-
timal public goods provision that allows to reach the reference utility levels, in
a program which has the rst best structure. When the government knows the
distribution of , the optimal provision of public goods is thus governed by the
Samuelson rule.
7Remark 4. A similar argument applies in the presence of externalities as in
Cremer, Gahvari, and Ladoux (1998). Suppose the agents' utility functions are
of the type
U(V (c;c);`)
where c is the individual consumption vector of private goods i = 1;:::;k, and c
denotes the collection of consumptions in the economy, which may in
uence indi-
vidual welfare but are treated as an externality. As in Section 3, one unit of good
i is produced from pi units of labor according to a linear technology. The gov-
ernment can non linearly tax income through an after tax income schedule R(),
and linearly tax goods by quoting a vector of consumer prices q dierent from
p. Then at a non-satiated second best allocation, there is a rst best Pigovian
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